DRDO has much to answer for its poor performance

DRDO has much to answer for its poor performance

By Dinesh Kumar | Chandigarh | 21 January, 2018
India has been unable to increase its self-reliance capability despite taking several steps.

On paper the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) comes across as formidable. It is currently engaged in about 70 projects that include making almost every major conventional weapon system and platform that major military powers are already manufacturing. From rifles and machine guns to tanks, fighter aircraft, airborne warning and control system, aircraft carrier and a wide array of missiles—surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and sub surface. In reality, the DRDO has much to answer for its performance.

The DRDO, entrusted with developing weapon systems for India’s defence requirement, is critical for ensuring a high degree of self-reliance. Its huge establishment comprises a partnership with over 40 academic institutions, 15 national science and technology agencies, 50 public sector undertakings including the nine defence public sector units, the 40 ordnance factories and the over 250 private sector industries. By 2008, an estimated 1,500 small and medium enterprises were engaged in supplying about 20% to 25% of defence components to defence firms.

Notwithstanding, however, India’s self-reliance continues to hover at 30% to 35% despite a series of measures taken by the government that has resulted in India continuing to remain overly import dependent for its defence requirements. India has been unable to increase its self-reliance capability from the current 30% to 35% despite a series of measures it has taken in the last two-and-a-half decades in particular. Much of even the existing self-reliance capability is based on licence manufacture and transfer of technology by foreign state-owned or private companies. What is more, the government itself has expressed doubts about the country’s capability to even develop core technologies in reports prepared by the parliamentary standing committee on defence.

The harsh reality is that India’s state-owned defence industry has been unable to even develop a rifle, let alone a tank or an aircraft engine. The DRDO has consistently been shifting the timeline for all projects, ranging from rifles to aircraft. Furthermore, the DRDO has been unable to successfully complete a single major project except for a few missile systems and the nuclear powered submarine, although the latter has several shortcomings in capability. The procurement process continues to be time consuming and the private industry remains mired in bureaucratic processes. Most of the private industry’s involvement currently is low scale and focused on making sub systems. It is yet to graduate to making complete weapon systems or highly sophisticated technologies as is the case with major defence companies in the US and Europe.

India’s mission to increase self-dependency for defence equipment to 70% remains a dream. In 1992, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, which had been India’s main source of weapons supply, catering to 70% of the country’s defence requirements, a defence ministry “Self Reliance Review Committee” conceived “a ten-year plan for Self-Reliance in Defence Systems”, which, starting from 1995, was aimed at increasing India’s self-reliance index to 70% by 2005. The defence ministry has now shifted its deadline to attain about 70% self-reliance by over two decades to 2027. But as of now, this seems unlikely in the next ten years.

Efforts of successive governments have failed despite two unprecedented decisions that were specifically aimed at facilitating the self-reliance process—(a) opening of the military-industrial complex to Indian private sector participation up to hundred per cent, and (b) opening up to foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26%, which was subsequently increased to 49% in 2014 and 100% in 2016.

The present government’s latest emphasis on “Make in India” is undoubtedly noble, but seemingly idealistic. It remains to be seen whether “Make in India” will translate into “Made in India” or remain “Assemble in India”, without intellectual property rights and design control. Perhaps there is wisdom in the advice of David Gross, a Nobel Laureate in Physics, who during a visit to India in January 2016 advised that in order to “Make in India”, the country should focus on first “Discover in India”, followed immediately by “Invent in India”, before it embarks on “Make in India”. But this seems unlikely, considering India’s inflexible, irrational and outdated bureaucracy and the fact that India overall has been spending a paltry 0.9% of its GDP on research and development, compared to 2.1% by China, 2.7% by the United States and 4.4% by South Korea.

India’s record of producing and exporting weapon systems is extremely modest. For example, India’s defence exports averaged a meagre US$88 million a year between 2006-07 and 2008-09, which marginally rose to $174 million in 2013-14 and $330 million in 2016. At a cursory level, the list of countries that have been importing Indian defence equipment is impressive, as it also includes the United States, United Kingdom and Russia. But a study of the equipment reveals that it is very rudimentary—flight control panels, forging equipment and electronic assemblies to the US, transmitting tubes to the UK and, to Russia, some spares and services for the Russian origin MiG-29 and Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft. None of these are critical technologies or anywhere close to a complete weapon system or a weapon platform.

In contrast, even while China is a major importer of defence hardware, it is at the same time also self-sufficient in certain key military technologies along with being a major weapons exporter. It was the fifth largest exporter of defence equipment to developing countries between 2000 and 2007, the third largest global supplier between 2010 and 2014 following an arms export increase by 143% and ranked fourth between 2008 and 2015 in arms transfer agreements with developing nations. China’s defence exports to developing countries averaged over $3 billion annually between 2011 and 2014, more specifically $2.5 billion in 2007, $2.2 billion in 2008, $3 billion in 2009, $1.9 billion in 2010, $3.2 billion in 2011, $3.4 billion in 2012, $4.2 billion in 2013 and $3.2 billion in 2014 and $ 6 billion in 2015.

India’s state-owned military industrial complex is characterised by flaws at several levels. Internal criticism against the military-industrial complex range from the way the DRDO is conceptualised and structured, its tendency to over reach, technological limitations and incapability; coordination problems with, and changing specifications by, the users, the myriad responsibilities of the head of the DRDO, the continuing limited involvement of the private sector and the predominant role of generalist bureaucrats with no expertise in defence. Moreover, the bureaucratisation of Indian science has created a scientific-work environment with features comprising caution, rules, reviews, screenings, scrutinies, committees, controls, centralisation, delays, doubts, indecision, inaction, suspicion, friction, and less communication.

Until India increases its self-dependence for its defence requirements, India’s import bill is only expected to rise, making it a foreign-made Indian armed force. But such overdependence has come at a high price for the country and the armed forces, which for the last two-and-a-half decades has been battling depleting force levels and antiquity of weapon systems.

The author is a defence analyst

 

There are 13 Comments

DRDO could not even develop a simple useful gun, pistol or rifle. It is controlled politically and gets negative remarks for any successful development as importing is lucrative for the politicians. They may not have any technical skill for developing advanced systems. No govt. cares about DRDO except to get a rosy pictorial report.

The basic reason is DRDO and Defence PSUs ,the factories under OFB are not accountable to their users ,that is the Armed Forces. DGQA which is the quality assurance agency is also under the same agency of MoD Production. DRDO has wasted so much of time, effort and money on such trivial items as Mosquito repellant for troops, Puli hora (Tamarind Rice),growing potatoes in Ladhak,bio toilets etc. None of these are commercially exploited. Regarding war like equipment the less said the better. Even the shelter for use in extreme cold climate is so highly inflammable, troops are shared of sleeping in them. The parachute developed by them is unreliable and if put in use will result in loss of highly trained forces. Insas was a failure. The Nepalese Army of Gorkhas lost a larger number of their soldiers due to the imported weapons from us failed them while using against insurgents. Most of the PSUs have become traders . Vehicle factory buys the vehicle from Tata,Leyland, Mahindra and sell it to Army with a huge mark up after a shoddy so called body building which is nothing but putting angle iron support for the tarpaulin cover. Buying tools from outside and putting in a box ,they call value addition. For the cost of transporting the chassis to Jabalpur from these factories, the OEM can build the body at a fraction.

Even though DRDO has the Best Scientists educated from reputed Institutes of India and of the World, they are not allowed to showcase their talents by a lobby promoting import of Defence equipment obviously fr getting high kick backs. Promotions to Scientists to the top posts are based on his present position to divert funds fr such purposes. Leave alone Scientists. PREY Govt will take corrective measures.

It appears that there are no structured development and R & D process @ DRDO - to manage Scope, Schedule and Specifications of the project. As a result - delay which is very dangerous because specifications changes over time. If products are not developed on timely manner and implemented, it will always keep you on the drawing board (specification changed by the time you can deliver first product). Availability of basic technology and skilled people is key to develop world class products.

Looks like author had a hearsay knowledge of a very important system. Lacks depth. I expected an objective cause analysis and solutions to improve with some case studies. In the present form, the article remains an another political soliloquy full of negative critism.

A very apt analysis. The DRDO, DPSU and OFB are white Elephant and the Govt cant make them dance.

Very good comment. Close down these units also so that we can buy everything from outside.

Any organisation is made of people. It is not some kind of machine, wherein you put oil(money and resources) and machine keeps running. So just collaboration with pvt sector, wont work. Act like one. Allow lateral entry of people. Behave humbly. Keep the flexibility. Somethings work, some wont. And last but not the least, if you want to induct freshers(which is generally not the case with big organisations, they prefer atleast 2-3 year experience), then dont make it some annual event, keep on recruiting people, whenever need arises.

The article seem to have been done without any analyses or reference to fact.

INDIA IS A. POOR BACKWARD NATION IN SCIENCE. AND TECHNOLOGY HENCE DRDO WILL BE BACKWARD IN PERFORMENCE NON VIOLENCE IS FOOLISH THEORY ONLY A. AGGRESSIVE DICTATOR CAN MAKE INDIA COMPARABLE WITH OTHER NATIONS HUGE POPULATION AND DEMOCRACY WILL. KEEP INDIA BACKWARD FOR EVER NO MIRACLE WILL HAPPEN

First of all, the DRDO has only developed one firearm i.e the JVPC in collaboration with OFB which is one of the best in its class; and the results from its tests are very good and should soon be into production. The failure of rifles(that too the early INSAS) belongs to the OFBs. DRDO was never involved in that project. Secondly the shortcomings in the nuclear submarine are not of the submarine itself but rather the outdated and imported armaments it carry, which is likely to be replaced by better indigenous ones this year. The K-4 SLBM, likely to be tested soon, will boost our SSBN capabilities as well. Also, there is little DRDO can do with the budget allocated for R&D which needs to be increased substantially. Some projects were delayed because of a lack of availability of test-beds & mounts (eg:- Kaveri engine & the AEW&CS project). In reality, a lot of responsibility lies with the MoD. Things will look up if we can give appropriate budget allocation, proper timelines, prioritization and infrastructure development.

One of my friends dad works in DRDO, and also have quarter facility. Once I asked what does your dad do at DRDO my friend laughed and said nothing at all. In the morning his dad goes to office, sign in register, play cards, lunch time comes home, sleeps for some time goes back signes the register has tea snacks comes home for the evening. And this has been his routine for 30 odd years. My blood was boiling when my friend laughed. 7th pay, quarters, canteen, hospital what not all does the DRDO provide and what do we get in return nothing. What a waste of my tax money.

A nauseating insight into the DRDO is obtained from the annual audit reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

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